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CRIMINAL DEFENDANT HAS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
PHYSICALLY CONFRONT WITNESS AT VIDEO-TAPED
DEPOSITION
United States v. Benfild, 593 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1979)
In United States v. Benfield' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
clarified the application of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause2
to a Rule 15 video-taped deposition3 used in lieu of deponent's per-
sonal appearance4 at a federal criminal trial.
1. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (emphasis added).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 provides in relevant part:
Depositions
(a) When taken. Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the
interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and
preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the
parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition ....
(b) Notice of taking. The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken shall give
to every party reasonable written notice of the time and place for taking the deposition.
The notice shall state the name and address of each person to be examined. . . . The
officer having custody of a defendant shall be notified of the time and place set for the
examination and shall, unless the defendant waives in writing the right to be present,
produce him at the examination and keep him in the presence of the witness during the
examination, unless, after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause
him to be removed from the place of the taking of the deposition, he persists in conduct
which is such as to justify his being excluded from that place. A defendant not in cus-
tody shall have the right to be present at the examination upon request subject to such
terms as may be fixed by the court, but his failure, absent good cause shown, to appear
after notice and tender of expenses in accordance with subdivision (c) of this rule shall
constitute a waiver of that right and of any objection to the taking and use of the deposi-
tion based upon that right.
(d) How taken. Subject to such additional conditions as the court shall provide, a dep-
osition shall be taken and filed in the manner provided in civil actions except as other-
wise provided in these rules, provided that (1) in no event shall a deposition be taken of a
party defendant without his consent, and (2) the scope and manner of examination and
cross-examination shall be such as would be allowed in the trial itself. The government
shall make available to the defendant or his counsel for examination and use at the
taking of the deposition any statement of the witness being deposed which is in the pos-
session of the government and to which the defendant would be entitled at the trial.
(e) Use. At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as other-
wise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive evidence if the
witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his dep-
osition. . ..
4. FED. R. CiuM. P. 15(e), supra note 3, also allows the use of a deposition at trial as sub-
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The government charged Russell Benfield in a four-count indict-
ment5 with the federal crime of misprision of the kidnapping of Patricia
Cady.6 Several months after the kidnapping, but before the trial, Cady
developed psychiatric problems resulting in her hospitalization and ne-
cessitating two trial continuances.7
Subsequently, the government filed a request to take a video-taped
deposition of Cady's testimony and, at the hearing on that request, her
psychiatrist testified that Cady's psychiatric problems were directly re-
lated to her kidnapping.8 He urged that if she must testify, the sur-
roundings be less stressful than those of a courtroom and that she not
be required to face Benfield.9 Granting the government's motion for a
deposition, the trial court ordered that Benfield could be "present at the
deposition but not within the vision of Mrs. Patricia Cady."'" Benfield,
without Cady's knowledge, monitored her deposition from a separate
room and, by sounding a buzzer, was able to interrupt the questioning
stantive evidence if "the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his depo-
sition." This use of the deposition was not at issue in Benfield and the court did not discuss it. But
see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (if witness testifies at trial, witness' prior state-
ment is admissible even if not subject to confrontation when made, as long as defendant is assured
of effective cross-examination at trial). Accord, Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1971). See
,generalhy Graham, Empl qing Inconsistent Statementsfor Impeachment and as Substantive Evi-
dence. A Critical Re'iew and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613,
and607, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1565 (1977).
5. 593 F.2d at 817.
6. Id 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) provides:
Misprision of felony
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
7. 593 F.2d at 817 & n.3. Following her rescue by law enforcement officers, Cady partici-
pated in a news conference and press interviews. Her subsequent illness, however, left her unable
to cope with crowd situations or work. Id
8. Id at 817.
9. Id
10. Id FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b), supra note 3, allows the trial court to fix the terms upon which
the defendant may be present at the deposition if the defendant is not in custody. The court of
appeals noted a possible equal protection problem because Rule 15(b) seems to allow greater
restrictions upon the defendant's presence at a deposition when the defendant is not in custody
than when he is in custody. Additionally, the trial court's conditional order for a deposition may
have violated Rule 15(d), supra note 3, which provides that "the scope and manner of examination
and cross-examination [at the deposition] shall be such as would be allowed in the trial itself."
The court of appeals did not resolve these questions because the parties failed to argue them or
sufficiently develop them in the appellate record. 593 F.2d at 820 n.7.
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to confer with his counsel outside the deposition room."I
The trial court admitted the video-taped deposition as substantive
evidence against Benfield and allowed it to be shown to the jury. 12
Benfield was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison.' 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, remanded, and held-
The sixth amendment's confrontation clause assures the active partici-
pation of the accused at all stages of his criminal trial, including at a
deposition. 4 Accordingly, in the absence of either a face-to-face meet-
ing between defendant and witness or a showing that defendant had
waived, forfeited, or lost by necessity his constitutional right of con-
frontation, the procedure that limited defendant's participation to mon-
itoring the video-taped deposition and conferring with his attorney
outside the deposition room after sounding a buzzer, without the depo-
nent's knowledge, was unconstitutional. 15
The sixth amendment guarantees the criminally accused the right to
confront the witnesses against him.' 6 In Mattox v. United States'7 the
11. 593 F.2d at 817. Benfield's lawyer was allowed to cross-examine Cady at the deposition.
Id
12. Id at 817, 822. FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4) (applicable to FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 deposition
proceedings through Rule 15(e), supra note 3) defines "unavailability as a witness" to include
situations in which the witness "is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity." Benfield argued that the video-taped
deposition's admission was improper because the government had failed to demonstrate the un-
availability of Cady at the time of trial. See Brief for Appellant at 39-42. The court of appeals
conceded that the government's showing of Cady's unavailability at trial was "marginal" because
the government had relied passively on the failure of Cady's psychiatrist to inform it of an im-
provement in Cady's condition. Nevertheless, the court did not reverse Benfield's conviction on
this ground, commenting that "[a]n additional showing of the witness' mental condition and avail-
ability on the trial date would have been a much better practice." 593 F.2d at 817 n.4. See also
note 41 infra.
13. 593 F.2d at 816-17.
14. Id at 821.
15. Id at 817, 820-22.
16. See note 2 sipra. The Supreme Court declared the right of confrontation fundamental
and applicable to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), overruling Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953), andWest v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904). For analyses testing
rules of evidence by the standard of due process of law, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294-303 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-100 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-08 (1959); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). See generally Baker,
The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor Determining
When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Griswold, The Due
Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1971); Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: 4 Unified Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. Rev. 567
(1978); Note, The Burger Court and the Confrontation Clause.- A Return to the Fair Trial Rule, 7 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 136 (1973).
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Supreme Court noted that although the defendant's right of confronta-
tion normally includes a face-to-face meeting with the witness and an
opportunity to subject the witness to cross-examination,' 8 these consti-
tutional safeguards must on occasion yield to "considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case."' 9 After balancing the interests
of the defendant and the public, the Court held that the testimony of a
now-deceased witness at defendant's earlier trial on the same charge
was admissible at defendant's retrial.
20
Following Mattox, the Court repeatedly defined the essential ele-
ments of the confrontation clause as physical confrontation and cross-
examination.2' In Douglas j' Alabama,22 however, the Court expressly
stated that physical confrontation is not an indispensable part of the
constitutional right.23 Thereafter in California v. Green,24 the Court
omitted physical confrontation from its list of attributes of the confron-
tation clause.2 5 The most recent decisions of the Supreme Court inter-
17. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
18. "The substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advan-
tage he has once had of seeing the witness lace to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a
cross-examination." Id at 244.
19. Id at 243. See notes 38-42 infra and accompanying text.
20. 156 U.S. at 243-44.
21. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) ("the privilege to confront
one's accusers and cross examine them lace to face is assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment"); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (right of confrontation was "intended
to secure the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face, and to thus sift the testimony
produced against him"); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (defendant has trial right to
Lonfront witnesses "upon whom he [the accused] can look while being tried, whom he is entitled
to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the estab-
lished rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases").
22. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
23. "Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it
is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the
clause even in the absence of physical confrontation." Id at 418. See also Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
24. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
25 Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the
possibility of a penalty for perjury, (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant's late to observe the demeanor of the witness in making
his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. (citation omitted).
Id at 158.
The Supreme Court has alluded to the demeanor aspect of confrontation on several occasions.
See, ;g. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895). But see The Supreme Court. 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 115 (1970) (in light of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/8
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preting the confrontation clause dwell on the defendant's right to
effective cross-examination2 6 and refer to physical confrontation only
incidentally.27
Despite the Court's conflicting statements about the requisites of
confrontation,28 it has emphasized the importance of the constitutional
holding in Calfornia v. Green allowing the admission into evidence of prior recorded testimony of
a witness testifying at trial, and the consequent denial of the factfinder's opportunity to observe
the witness' demeanor when he was giving his earlier testimony, "the factfinder's observation of
the witness' confrontation with the defendant is not constitutionally required" (citations omitted)).
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973).
27. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) ("Confrontation means more than
being allowed to confront the witness physically. 'Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause
hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.'" (citing Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
28. See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text. The result of the Court's conflict is exem-
plified by the confusion within the Fifth Circuit. Compare Canal Zone v. P. (Pinto), 590 F.2d
1344, 1352 (5th Cir. 1979) ("cross-examination is the essential right secured by the confrontation
clause"), with United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[tlhe primary object of
the confrontation clause is to permit personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
by the defendant"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977).
The documentary history of the sixth amendment sheds little light on the exact meaning of the
confrontation clause. See generali, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-79 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) and sources cited therein.
Some commentators believe that the confrontation clause was designed to prevent the kind of
abuse that characterized the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in England in 1603. Raleigh was con-
victed and later executed for treason, based upon depositions and ex parte affidavits, with no
opportunity to call his own witnesses or cross-examine those adverse to him. See United States v.
Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 457-65 (4th Cir.) (concurring and dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
876 (1974); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
104-06 (2d ed. 1969); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 216-29 (1926); 1 J. STE-
PHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 333-37 (1883); Stephen, The TrialofSir
Walter Raleigh, in 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 172-87 (4th ser. 1919);
Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381, 388-89 (1959).
Before the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, a delegate at the Massachusetts conven-
tion objected to the lack of protections afforded the criminally accused. The nature of his argu-
ments ultimately proved persuasive:
Mr. President, I rise to make some remarks on the paragraph under consideration,
which treats of the judiciary power.
It is a maxim universally admitted, that the safety of the subject consists in having a
right to a trial as free and impartial as the lot of humanity will admit of. Does the
Constitution make provision for such a trial? I think not ....
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether the criminal is to be allowed the
benefit of counsel; whether he is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to face; whether
he is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantages of cross-examina-
tion, we are not yet told.
These are matters of by no means small consequence; yet we have not the smallest
constitutional security that we shall be allowed the exercise of these privileges . ...
On the whole, when we fully consider this matter, and fully investigate the powers
Washington University Open Scholarship
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right as a whole by limiting the exceptions thereunder.29 Diaz v. United
States30 announced one such exception. On two occasions during his
trial for homicide, defendant Diaz voluntarily left the courtroom, ex-
pressly consenting to the trial's continuation in his absence.' While
Diaz was away, two adverse witnesses testified against him and were
cross-examined by his attorney.32 In ruling that the trial court did not
err in permitting the trial to proceed despite the defendant's absence,
the Court explained that a defendant could affirmatively waive his
right to confront witnesses against him.33
granted, explicitly given, and specially delegated, we shall find Congress possessed of
powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribu-
nal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of Christendom: I mean that diabolical
institution, the Inquisition.
(emphasis in original). 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
109-11 (reprint 1974) (1st ed. 1836). See also I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 505-10 (1971).
Many state constitutions or statutes expressly guarantee face-to-face meetings between defend-
ant and the witnesses against him, thereby resolving any ambiguity that might otherwise exist
concerning the physical aspect of confrontation. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 801-2 (1976); ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 263, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 763.1 (1970);
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 29-01-06 (1974); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TENN. CODE ANN. 40-2405 (1975); WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 7.
29. See notes 30-42 infra and accompanying text.
Consider the related problem of determining under what circumstances the right of confronta-
tion is not invoked, whereby the question of the scope of the exceptions to confrontation is not
reached. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934) (defendant not entitled to
accompany jury at view of crime scene); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1911)
(notes of trial judge and clerk pertaining to conduct of trial and supplementing appellate record
not subject to confrontation); Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176, 1184 (2d Cir. 1970) (right of
confrontation does not entitle accused to discovery of evidence that is not ultimately introduced
by prosecution at trial), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 579
(2d Cir. 1969) (right of confrontation does not compel prosecution to call particular witnesses);
Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421,422 (9th Cir. 1958) (same); United States v. Johnson, 129
F.2d 954, 959 (3rd Cir. 1942) (defendant may be excluded from courtroom during argument on
question of law), affd on other grounds, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936, 938
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (right of confrontation does not compel prosecution to call particular witnesses).
30. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
31. Id at 453.
32. Id
33. Id at 455. ,4ccord, Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973). Earlier Supreme
Court opinions had implied that no aspect of a criminal trial could be held in a defendant's ab-
sence. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("in felonies, it is not in the
power of the prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present
during the trial"); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) ("[tlhat which the law makes essential in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/8
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The Supreme Court went further in Illinois v. Allen.34 During his
trial for robbery, Allen continually disrupted the trial despite judicial
warnings to behave.35 The Court held that defendant, as a result of his
misconduct, forfeited36 his right of confrontation and that the decision
to remove him and proceed with the trial in the presence of his attorney
proceedings involving the deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the
consent of the accused").
Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences" (footnote omitted)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) ("[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege"). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (accused may
waive right of confrontation by pleading guilty); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 583-84
(1959) (when defendant admitted truth of state attorney's statements of details of crime and of
defendant's criminal record, defendant implicitly waived right of confrontation on those state-
ments); United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1973) (defendant may stipulate to
admission of evidence and thus waive right to confront source of evidence), cer. denied, 417 U.S.
948 (1974).
34. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
35. Id at 339-41. Allen was readmitted to the courtroom on several occasions, and the judge
offered Allen the option of remaining at the trial if Allen would promise good behavior. Allen
replied, "I'll promise you shit." Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 38, Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337 (1970), cited in The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 25, at 91 n.6.
36. Conpare Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendantfrom His Own Trial A Com.
parative View, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 171, 173 (1964) (arguing that repeated misconduct by defend-
ant after warning amounts to voluntary waiver), with PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE To FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b) (1978) (discussing
proposed change in language concerning exceptions to requirement that defendant be present at
every stage of his criminal trial:
Subdivision (b) is amended so as to deal with the situations included therein in terms of
forfeiture rather than waiver. Although waiver terminology is commonly found in the
cases, a defendant who absents himself or who engages in disruptive conduct does not
really "agree" to be tried in his absence or "intentionally relinquish" his right to be
present. Rather he loses or forfeits his right to be present by way of a penalty for violat-
ing certain obligations or conditions. This is more than a matter of semantics. In Illinois
v. Allen, holding that a disruptive defendant may be excluded from his trial, the Court
did not conclude that the defendant had waived his right to be present, but rather than
[sic] he "lost his right" by virtue of his behavior "of such an extreme and aggravated
nature as to justify either his removal from the courtroom or his total physical restraint."
[397 U.S. at 346.1 The court of appeals had reached the opposite result by analyzing the
case in terms of waiver and concluding that so long as Allen insisted upon his right to be
present, which he clearly did, he could not be held to have waived it because "the insis-
tence of a defendant that he exercise this right under unreasonable conditions does not
amount to a waiver." 413 F.2d 232[, 235] (7th Cir. 1969)).
(citations omitted).
See also Note, Illinois v. Allen: The Unruly Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
120, 132-34 (1971); 22 S.D. L. REV. 447 (1977); 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 455 (1967).
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was proper.3 7
The Supreme Court elucidated the final exception to the right of con-
frontation-the necessity exception-in Mancusi v. Stubbs.31 Defend-
ant Stubbs claimed that a Tennessee court, in retrying him for murder,
had violated his constitutional right of confrontation by admitting the
testimony of a witness at his previous trial.3 9 The government argued
that the witness, who had moved to Sweden before the retrial, was un-
available. Holding that the witness' testimony at the first trial bore
"sufficient indicia of reliability,"4" the Supreme Court ruled that the
Tennessee court, after finding that the witness was, in fact, unavaila-
ble4' to testify at the second trial, had properly admitted the testimony
37. 397 U.S. at 343. With its strong emphasis on defendant's misbehavior, the forfeiture
exception to the right of confrontation has been limited to extreme cases of misconduct by the
accused. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (defendant who voluntarily
keeps a witness from testifying cannot insist on right of confrontation); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (witness' prior grand jury testimony held admissible despite
absence of confrontation with defendant because defendant's intimidation of witness caused wit-
ness' unavailability at trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d
637, 648-51 (6th Cir.) (defendant who brings about denial of confrontation in furtherance of his
own interests may not complain of violation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1008 (1975); c. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam) (bailiffs misconduct violated
defendant's right of confrontation); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965) (prosecutor's
misconduct violated defendant's right of confrontation); State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 78-79, 288
A.2d 163, 168 (1972) (defendant's absence, through no fault of his own, at deposition of witness
violated defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation); Carlson, Argument to the Jury and
the Constitutional Right of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (1973) (if prosecutor refers to
evidence outside the record in his summation, burden should be on prosecution to establish that
error was harmless). See also Graham. The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
JIalter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 139 (1972) ("[a] defendant who murders
a witness ought not be permitted to invoke the right of confrontation to prohibit the use of his
accusation").
38. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
39. Id at 209. This case arose after Stubbs was convicted of a felony in a New York state
court. In his habeas corpus petition, Stubbs alleged that because his earlier Tennessee conviction
was unconstitutional, the New York state court could not use the Tennessee conviction as a predi-
cate for a harsher punishment under New York's second offender laws. Id at 205.
40. The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there "are indicia of reliabil-
ity which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant," Dutton v. Ev-
ans. . .[400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)], and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement," California v. Green... [399 U.S. 149, 161
(1970)]. It is clear from these statements, and from numerous prior decisions of this
Court, that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony must bear some
of these "indicia of reliability" referred to in Dutton.
408 U.S. at 213.
41. Compare United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 498-502 (8th Cir. 1976) (witness who
testified to memory lapse and invoked fifth amendment privilege was not "unavailable" at trial),
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into evidence at Stubb's retrial.42
The necessity exception to confrontation is reflected in Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 43 Under Rule 15 deposition evi-
dence is admissible at trial44 if the deponent is unavailable to testify.45
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977), with United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1976)
(witness who testified to lack of memory concerning material portion of subject matter of his prior
testimony was "unavailable" at trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977), and United States v.
Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 197 1) (declarant who refused to take oath and made it clear that
he would not testify was "unavailable" at trial), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
See generaly FED. R. EviD. 804(a), defining "unavailability as a witness" as including situa-
tions in which the witness
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying con-
cerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite
an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2),
(3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent
of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
But see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968) (state must make good-faith effort at ob-
taining attendance of witness at trial before court may declare witness unavailable); Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458, 467-74 (1900) (witness' prior testimony inadmissible because negli-
gence of prosecution caused declarant's absence at trial); United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011,
1022-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (party offering out-of-court statement carries burden of demonstrating
unavailability of declarant); but cf United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1290 (2d Cir. 1974) (trial
court's unavailability ruling reviewable only for abuse of discretion).
See generally Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Part 1, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
1076, 1101-06 (1969); Note, The Unavailability Requirementfor Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 41
Mo. L. REv. 404 (1976); 55 IOWA L. REv. 477 (1969).
42. 408 U.S. at 216.
43. See note 3 supra.
44. See, e.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting contention
that confrontation clause prohibits use of witness' deposition at criminal trial), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367, 374 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 965 (1974); United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1972) (same), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). See 19 N.Y.L.F. 198 (1973); 1973 UTAH L. REv. 839. See generalv
Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight ofthe Material Witness, 55 IowA L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1969).
45. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 15(e), supra note 3. See notes 12, 41 supra.
The Supreme Court has stated that the right of confrontation is not a mere codification of the
hearsay rule and its exceptions. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (plurality opin-
ion) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary
hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline
to do so now.") (footnotes omitted); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934). But cf. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926)
(purpose of confrontation clause is to preserve the common-law right and its exceptions). See also
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Moreover, with recent technological advances in the field of electronics,
depositions by video tape are gaining recognition at federal criminal
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (if testimony is critical to defense, "hearsay rule
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends ofjustice").
Nevertheless, the policies underlying the necessity exception to confrontation and the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule are similar. See. e.g.. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 80-83 (allowing
admission at criminal trial of declaration by co-conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy); Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. at 165 (alternative holding) (allowing admission at criminal trial of prior
recorded testimony of now-unavailable witness if defendant had opportunity to cross-examine
that witness at time of recording); Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924) (allowing
admission at criminal trial of declaration by co-conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy); Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (allowing admission at criminal trial of prior recorded
testimony of now-unavailable witness because defendant had opportunity to cross-examine at
time of recording); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (allowing admission at crimi-
nal trial of dying declaration); United States v. Martinez, 573 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1978) (al-
lowing admission at criminal trial of declaration by co-conspirator in furtherance of conspiracy);
McLaughlin v. Vinzant, 522 F.2d 448, 450-51 (1st Cir.) (allowing admission at criminal trial of
spontaneous utterance), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730,
734-36 (9th Cir. 1975) (allowing admission at criminal trial of declaration by co-conspirator in
furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d
795, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1970) (allowing admission at criminal trial of entries in the regular course of
business), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971); Hanley v. United States, 416 F.2d 1160, 1167-68 (5th
Cir. 1969) (same), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770-71
(2d Cir. 1965) (allowing admission at criminal trial of recorded past recollection), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 947 (1966); Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723, 724 (5th Cir. 1965) (allowing admission at criminal
trial of public records of routine character). But see, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25
(1968) (expanding "unavailability" concept beyond its traditional hearsay definition); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 53-56 (1899) (denying admission at criminal trial of record of convic-
tion of thieves to prove that property received by defendant had been stolen); Phillips v. Neil, 452
F.2d 337, 343-48 (6th Cir. 1971) (refusing admission at criminal trial of entry in the regular course
of business), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).
See generaly Baker, supra note 16; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and
the Forgetful Witness, 56 Tax. L. REV. 151 (1978); Griswold, supra note 16; Read, The New Con-
frontaton-The Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and
the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1971); Westen, supra note 16; Younger, Hear-
'ar. and Confrontation, Or, What Ever;' Criminal Defense Lasyer Should Have in Mind When He
Objects to the Prosecutor:s Offer ofHearsqa, 2 NATL J. CRIit. DaF. 65 (1976); Note, Confrontation,
Cro,,s-Eraminaton and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939 (1968); Note, The Use of
Prior Recorded Testimony and the Right of Confrontation, 54 IOWA L. REV. 360 (1968); Note,
Hcrsar, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651 (1970); Note,
Pre wrving the Right to Confrontaton--A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials,
113 U. P,%. L. REV. 741 (1965); Note, Hearsat, and Confrontation.: Can the Criminal Defendant's
Rights Be Preserved Under a BifurcatedStandard?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 243 (1975); 38 LA. L.
RE. 85S (1978); 40 Mo. L. REv. 150 (1975); 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966); 31 VAND. L. REV.
682 (1978); 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
Se also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 252 (2d ed.
1972); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE at 800 [04] (1977); 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDEN,CE §§ 1365, 1395-1400 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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trials.46
46. See, e.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
966 (1977); cf Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505-07 (8th Cir. 1972) (allowing admission at
criminal trial of video-taped confession by defendant).
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) (applicable to criminal trials through FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d), suora
note 3, provides:
The court may upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by other
than stenographic means, in which event the order shall designate the manner of record-
ing, preserving, and filing the deposition, and may include other provisions to assure that
the recorded testimony will be accurate and trustworthy. If the order is made, a party
may nevertheless arrange to have a stenographic transcription made at his own expense.
(emphasis added).
See State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 27-29, 559 P.2d 136, 147-49 (1976) (en banc) (allowing admis-
sion at criminal trial of video-taped testimony by non-key witness), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921
(1977); People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398,410, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413,420 (1974) (allowing admis-
sion at criminal trial of video-taped testimony by main prosecution witness; "[v]ideo tape is suffi-
ciently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to properly perform its function"); Hutchins v.
State, 286 So.2d 244, 245-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (allowing admission at criminal trial of
video-taped testimony by expert witness); State v. Hewett, 86 Wash. 2d 487,490-94, 545 P.2d 1201,
1203-05 (1976) (en banc) (allowing admission at criminal trial of video-taped testimony by vic-
tim).
In Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Missouri
sustained, as consistent with the confrontation clause, the use of closed circuit television in the
examination of an absent witness at a criminal trial. The city's expert witness testified from the
crime laboratory while the judge, parties and counsel watched from the courtroom. As noted by
the Supreme Court of Missouri, the two-way closed circuit television system causes the transmis-
sion ofpictures and voices to be instantaneous. Id at 337. In contrast, a video-taped deposition is
not a present event, but a record of a past event. See Weis, Electronics Expand Courtrooms' Walls,
63 A.B.A. J. 1713, 1715 (1977). The distinction might be significant in light of the requirement
that a witness be unavailable at a federal criminal trial before the trial court may admit a deposi-
tion by that witness as substantive evidence against the accused. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e),
supra note 3. When using closed circuit television, because the witness is testifying at the time of
the trial, it might be unnecessary to show that the witness is unavailable to testify in the court-
room. But see 44 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 517 (1976) (arguing that due to the unique characteristics of
closed circuit television, its use at a criminal trial, unlike the use of video tape, violates the defend-
ant's right of confrontation).
A wealth of material discussing the use of video tape at various stages of the trial process exists;
most commentators advocate its use in the courtroom. See generally Barber & Bates, Videotape in
Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1974); Bermant & J acoubovitch, Fish Out of Water.-
A Brie/Overview ofSocial and Psychological Concerns about Videotaped Trials, 26 HASTINGS L. J.
999 (1975); Cunningham, Videotape Evidence: Technological Innovation in the Trial Process, 36
ALA. LAW. 228 (1975); Doret, Trial by Videotape-Can Justice Be Seen to Be Done?, 47 TEMP.
L.Q. 228 (1974); Kennelly, The Practical Uses of Trialvision and Depovision, 1972 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 183; Kornblum & Rush, Television in Courtroom and Classroom, 59 A.B.A.J. 273 (1973);
Leibson, How and When to Use Video Tape Depositions, 42 Ky. BENCH & B. 30 (Apr. 1978);
McCrystal, Videotape Trials: Relieffor Our Congested Courts, 49 DEN. L.J. 463 (1973); Miller,
Videotaping the Oral Deposition, 18 PRAC. LAW. 45 (1972); Morrill, Enter-The Video Tape Trial,
3 J. MAR. J. PAC. & PROC. 237 (1970); Note, Videotape Trials.- Legal and Practical Implications, 9
COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 (1973); Note, Nebraska Faces Videotape.- The New Video Tech-
nology in Perspective, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 214 (1972); Note, Video-Tape Trials: 4 Practical
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